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The Declining Role of Filial Loyalty in Old-Age Support

By Lauren Ferstandig

As the majority of the world begins to modernize, the issue of old-age security has become more pressing. As many third world countries progress through the transition from rural based society to a more industrial society structure, many of the traditional family-oriented institutions have begun to disintegrate. With the deterioration of the family structure, the role of the elderly becomes much more economically and socially important, and questions of old-age security begin to arise. For the elderly, old-age security has always been an important issue, and quite often, the answers come in the form of children. In many developing countries, security in old age can be attained through savings, jewelry, land, and other forms of inheritance. Unfortunately, in less developed countries these means are quite hard to acquire, and the role of children becomes much more important, and therefore, many argue, that fertility levels are affected by concerns for old-age security (Nugent, 76).

Although the issues of old-age security are important in both developed and developing societies, Asia, and especially South Asia, have experienced many difficulties with the role of the elderly in the constantly modernizing societies. In 1990, Asia had 230 million people over the age of 60, which was by far the largest percent per continent in the world (World Bank, 50). As a result of these high numbers, Asia has the highest old-age dependency ratios in the third world, which makes it an ideal place to document the complex relationship between filial loyalty and old-age security (World Bank, 50). Although the relationship between old-age security and the fertility levels has never been studied directly, the subject continues to be debated among demographers as the concerns regarding these issues continue to heighten.

Due to strong cultural traditions, children have always been the primary source of old-age support in Asia. Parents who have sufficient means generally set aside various assets, such as currency, gold, commodities, livestock, land and structures, that will help maintain monetary security after they retire (Nugent, 76). Unfortunately, all of these assets are extremely vulnerable to both nature and the state of the economy, and, in case of emergency, children are one of the only forms of support (Nugent, 76). Material assets are also vulnerable to the occurrence of adverse selection, which often results in the seller receiving a very low profit from their goods due to the buyer’s uncertainty over the quality of the good (Nugent, 77). This unreliability of material goods intensifies the importance of family in old-age security.

In his study "The Old-Age Security Motive for Fertility" Jeffery B. Nugent believes that fertility becomes an important factor in old-age support when "there are underdeveloped capital markets; uncertainty about the accumulation of assets necessary for old age and disability; absence of private and public old age insurance programs; confidence of the loyalty of children and parents; absence of well-developed labor markets for women and children; the absence of a spouse of is of a young age" (Nugent, 76). Unfortunately, many of these situations occur regularly throughout Southern Asia, and quite often in rural areas the role of filial loyalty has been degrading and larger numbers of children are needed to help ensure security for the parents (World Bank, 52). In both rural and urban areas the role of filial loyalty, which had once been standard in Asian culture, has been broken down by poor communications systems and occupational structures, which push the elderly out of the work force and reduces their access to family support (World Bank, 52). These changes in the structure of society strongly affect the expectations surrounding parental support, and, therefore many parents feel that they must have more children as a means of ensuring that at least one child will help with their security (World Bank, 52)

Although the effects of old-age dependency influence all members of the older age groups, quite often, elderly women are affected more than their male counterparts. Women over the age of 60 are, quite frequently, widowed, since women have a longer life expectancy and they tend to marry older than themselves (Nugent, 81). The typical wife in a less developed country can expect to outlive her husband by 5 to 14 years, which can become a problem is she does not have sufficient assets to support herself (Nugent, 81). In communities where opportunities for both young and old women are not well established, old-age security is likely to play a large role in fertility decisions, purely because the women will have little else beyond their children to rely on in old age (Nugent, 80).

In nearly all Hindu and Muslim countries in Asia, filial support is a standard aspect of culture. In these countries, over 75% of all elderly live with their children (World Bank, 52). These high numbers are strongly influenced by strong loyalty training from the women in the family, and, quite often, through careful manipulation of values, parents can teach their children that it is morally and socially good to support the elderly (Nugent, 78). This kind of loyalty training only works when the family’s moral values are not affected by education, extrahousehold employment opportunities, and the size, instability and growth of the community (Nugent, 79). In many South Asian countries, the entire burden of parental support rests on the sons, and therefore, in these countries, high fertility is prevalent as a means of ensuring that the parents give birth to enough sons to provide for them late in life (World Bank, 57).

Although the relationship between fertility and old-age security has never been directly documented, there are several studies that indicate that there is a positive correlation between the two. The Value of Children Project, which conducted interviews with almost 30,000 married young adults across nine countries (the United States, West. Germany, Singapore, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey) concluded that the old-age security value of children is seen as great in less developed countries and non-existent in developing countries (Nugent, 88). In every society surveyed, both developing and developed, a higher percentage of women gave old-age security as a good reason for having children, and in all countries but Taiwan, the reason for having another child is linked to security (Nugent, 88). Another study known as "Knowledge, Attitude, Practice", conducted between 1950 and 1970, surveyed 173 subjects in multiple countries. Although the number of people surveyed was small, and the focus of the questions was not on the relationship between old-age support and fertility, the surveyor concluded that parents evaluate "children as the sources of family strength and the economic anchor of the family, and sons as the security against old age" (Nugent, 88). Although these studies do not establish the role of old-age support in fertility decisions, the strong sentiments of those surveyed regarding the security provided by their children does support the argument that security and fertility are connected.

As one of the most complicated and controversial countries regarding the issue of old-age support, India has been the subject of many studies regarding the relationship between security and fertility. The Vlassoff and Vlassoff study from 1980, is one of the more famous accounts of the increasingly problematic situation in India. After surveying 357 ever-married men across India, the Vlassoff’s felt that they could conclude that old-age security played no role in fertility decisions (Nugent, 85). They felt that the joint residences of adults with their children was not motivated by old-age support, but could only be viewed as a natural stage in the Indian family cycle (Nugent, 85). The Vlassoff’s felt that these results coupled with unlikelihood that security played a role in fertility decisions due to the large period of time between fertility conception and retirement confirmed their hypothesis regarding the unimportance of old-age security in fertility matters.

The Vlassoff’s study has met a large amount of opposition from those who feel that their survey was too narrow to be considered accurate. The largest flaw sited in the Vlassoff study was the obvious lack of women in the survey pool. As I have previously discussed, women often experience the most severe effects of the old-age security problem due to their longer life expectancy and the cultural tradition of young wives taking older husbands. By neglecting to include women, the Vlassoff’s have overlooked a large portion of the old-age dependency issue, and, therefore, their survey is biased and, most likely, inaccurate.

Mead Cain’s 1981 study of several Indian and Bangladeshi villages has been widely regarded as the most successful study in opposition of the Vlassoff’s survey. Cain studied both elderly men and women in three villages and found that, under conditions of old-age risks in addition to generalized risks, and in the absence of efficient risk coping institutions, having a large family size is beneficial to the elderly (Dharmalingam, 5). In a similar manner to the Vlassoff’s study, Cain’s has several flaws, the most prominent problem was that his study only provided two data points (the two groups of villages), which makes it difficult to distinguish the effects of insecurity on fertility from the many other factors that may have affected fertility. These weaknesses in Cain’s findings make it very difficult to form any conclusive applicable evidence from his study.

In response to both Mead and the Vlassoffs’ experiments, A.Dharmalingam conducted his own study in a village in South India in the summer of 1987. Dharmalingam collected data from the adult men, elderly men and elderly women of the village (Dharmalingam, 6). Eighty Five percent of the 1451 person village was peasants, and Dharmalingam notes that modernization has moved the society away from agriculture and family business and driven the people in the direction of unskilled labor (Dharmalingam, 7). This shift in economic activity has led to greater economic independence of the individual worker and a degradation of family ties, which has resulted in the growing failure rate of old-age support in the village (Dharmalingam, 8).

With the corrosion of the old-age support system, the control of land becomes extremely important. In nearly all of the studies, old-age security depended largely on land acquisition and control; the importance of land stems mainly from its ability to guarantee income, either through farming or as a commodity (Dharmalingam, 10). Therefore, in Dharmalingam’s village, it is not surprising that the landless have many more concerns regarding their security in old age. Only 25% of the adults tested reported that they had land on which to fall back when they could no longer work. Sadly, it is often the landless who experience the least support from their children. While 75% of those surveyed who possessed land as an asset felt sure they could rely on a son’s support, only 55% of the landless had such faith in their children (Dharmalingam, 10).

As I have previously mentioned, the degradation of the filial loyalty system has had a severe impact on the state of old-age support in India. In many areas of India parents, after they retire, are not given rooms within the houses of their sons and are forced to either sleep on the porch or in a public place (Dharmalingam, 11). More than 1/3 of the elderly reported that, although it is socially expected, they did not receive any support from their sons, a practice that would have been unheard of in India 50 years before (Dharmalingam, 15). Men often receive more support from their sons than women, who often have to rely on their daughter’s husbands, for food and care (Dharmalingam, 13). Based on the results of his survey, Dharmalingam was able to make a conclusive connection between the old-age support and the size of the family. He discovered that women who averaged 1.7 living sons and 1.4 living daughters had a lower standard of living and much less security than women who averaged 2.9 living sons and 2.4 living daughters (Dharmalingam, 18).

As old-age support has continued to deteriorate, both elderly men and women have been realizing that they must continue working much later in life as a means of supporting themselves in the absence of family and social support. Sixty five percent of men between the ages 40 and 59 believe that they will not be able to retire by the age 60 due to lack of funds and security (Dharmalingam, 9). The need to work beyond retirement age is not confined to men in India; nearly one half of the elderly women in the village lived alone, and, therefore had to work as their only means of support (Dharmalingam, 12). In Indian society, the elderly are rarely granted any working benefits as a result of their age and condition, and therefore they must complete extremely time and labor-intensive jobs; as much as one third of the working elderly stated that they had no free time due to the demands of their job (Dharmalingam, 14)

In addition to the newly directed attention toward the growing importance of children, and therefore, fertility, in old-age security, several social systems, both formal and informal have arisen as a means of alleviating the stresses of old-age support. Informal systems of social security, which implies the absence of government assistance, are certainly the most prevalent form of organized old-age security throughout the third world. Although filial support is by far the most popular form of informal assistance, there are many organizations that involve local communities, informal clubs, religious organizations and kinship networks that provide aid for the elderly (World Bank, 50). Many large families or small villages also practice risk pooling, which involves pooling money and assets as a means of promoting security (World Bank, 55). While risk pooling is extremely effective in certain situations, it can also be harmful to the participants. If the family or group lives within the same village and/or takes part in the same occupation, any economic or natural effects on the village or business will be magnified (World Bank, 56).

Manipulation, by the elderly, of the expectations surrounding filial loyalty has also become a means of informal support. Many parents attempt to retain control of their household’s resources (land, jewelry, house, cattle) as well as the household savings almost until death as a means of maintaining control of and respect from their children (World Bank, 58). Competition between siblings for the family assets quite often results in increased care and affection for the parents, and many Asian parents use this to their own advantage (World Bank, 58). Many demographers argue that this goal of increasing sibling rivalry over the family assets contributes positively to the parents’ fertility motives, and quite often results in larger families (World Bank, 58).

Although informal security systems are highly effective, they are highly sensitive the social changes provoked my modernization. As the Asian countries continue to industrialize, and more young adults move from the countryside to the cities the social sanctions of the various villages have less control over their social, political and economic decisions, which consequently leads to the breakdown of informal institutions (World Bank, 59). The growing education levels among the young also have a negative effect on the informal support systems. As children continue to spend more time at school, their decreased time with the family affects the filial support system. The increased knowledge also undermines the respect for the elderly and the power of family business (World Bank, 60). Industrializing countries also experience legal and political changes that have a negative effect on the informal support systems. Laws regarding the distribution of family assets drastically reduce the elderly’s control over their children. The children no longer have to impress their parents with care and attention as a means of assuring a decent share of the family inheritance, and, although this does not always reduce the old-age support provided by the family, there are many "deadbeat children" who would neglect their parents if there were no immediate benefits resulting from their attention (World Bank, 60).

The introduction of government-sponsored, formal, arrangements for old-age support is arguably the strongest proponent in the breakdown of the traditional informal security agreements. Many Asian countries have introduced formal pension and social security systems, which have begun replace the need for filial support for the old (Nugent, 82). As a result of the recent introduction of these systems into the majority of Asian society, the effects of these pension and security systems on fertility have yet to be documented (Nugent, 82). Some studies have, indirectly, found little or no correlation between pension and fertility, while other studies have stated the possibilities of negative effects on fertility from the introduction of social security plans (Nugent, 82). China has had large amounts of success with formal security structures, which, combined with the strong traditional filial loyalty system, have made their old-age support system one of the strongest in third world Asia (World Bank, 50). Unfortunately, the positive affects of social security have been confined to developed countries and the urban areas of the less developed countries, leaving the rural areas of third world Asia with no formal support and a quickly deteriorating informal security network (Nugent, 82).

As Asia continues to make the slow transition from a traditional agricultural-based economy into modern industrial society, demographers recognize the importance of maintaining many of the informal security structures. As I have shown throughout this report, the growing prevalence of government-aided social security programs in Asia has been "crowding out" many informal policies, most notably filial support (World Bank, 66). Demographers stress that, especially in the rural areas of third world Asia, these informal institutions continue to play a crucial role in old-age support, and, therefore, it is imperative that the government policies compliment and not destruct the informal policies (World Bank, 66). If the Asian governments can manipulate their formal security institutions to help "crowd in" rather than "crowd out" informal support, than there may be some alleviation in the old-age security problem.

Unfortunately, these concerns regarding the declining filial assistance are a serious issue in many Asian countries. Even China and Japan, traditionally two of the strongest examples of filial support systems, have been experiencing a decline in their familial security networks. Between the years 1974 and 1983, the share of middle-aged children in Japan providing economic support for their parents declined from 45% to 40%, and the percentage of people 65 years of age and older living with their children dropped from 77% to 65% (World Bank, 64). This situation seems negligible in comparison to India, where many parents are forced to starve to death due to insufficient support from their children, but both situations are problematic (Dharmalingam, 18). Both cases call attention to the need for a solution to the increasing old-age support issue in Asia. As Asian countries continue to industrialize, governments must attempt to enact policies that both provide security for the elderly while also promoting loyalty and support from the family.