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Children as Old Age Security in Africa

By Sam Goedecke

When individuals grow old, they have an increasingly difficult time supporting themselves. To cope with this problem, the elderly rely on government policies, private market plans, or their family to support them. In the developing countries of Africa, government policies and market plans are inefficient or absent, and the elderly must rely upon their families for assistance. The result is the perception of children as old age security because the most important support for elderly people is their sons and daughters (Khasiani, 1994). The notion that having more children is the best alternative presents a major threat to a continent that is struggling to deal with the tremendous pressures of a growing population. Most African countries have extremely large younger populations, and as these populations age, the elderly populations will grow drastically (Khasiani, 1994). Not only will further population growth put pressure on the land and food supplies, but supporting the enormous elderly population of the future will be problematic. Therefore, old age security is one of the most important issues in Africa today. This paper examines how the flow of wealth through Kenyan and Rwandan families influences fertility. First it looks at why there may be a strong correlation between fertility and old age security, and then examines the ways in which children provide support to their elderly parents. Finally, this paper argues that demographic transition theory does not adequately describe population growth in Africa, and that theories of African population growth must focus greater attention on the flow of wealth across family generations.

Many factors may contribute to children’s role as old age security in African countries (Clay, 1993). Potential parents often feel very uncertain about their future and choosing to have more or less children will effect their lives in the long run. Such uncertainties may pertain to their accumulation of assets, the quality of old age and disability programs, how loyal their children will be, and for how long they will actually experience old age. This last factor is extremely relevant. Although life expectancy at birth is much lower in Africa’s developing countries than it is in countries such as the United States, once an individual is sixty years old, there is a significant chance he or she will live ten or fifteen years longer (Clay, 1993). It may be very difficult for potential parents to plan their savings, their assets, and the number of children to accommodate their life spans.

One reason parents choose to have a high fertility is because they believe having many children will increase the family’s wealth by supplying more labor on the farm or in the house. This reasoning is particularly predominant in rural areas where subsistence farming is most common (Clay, 1993). Moreover, in many societies larger families often experience a stronger social and political standing. Both the provision of labor and this "upward social mobility" due to high fertility may increase the likelihood of old age security for parents (Clay, 1993).

Whether or not one’s children will be loyal is also a crucial factor. Should a couple have only a few very loyal children, than they should expect to be well taken care of in their old age. But having only a few children who express little loyalty may be devastating if the couple has no other forms of old age security. Therefore, the uncertainty regarding whether children will be loyal acts as an incentive to have many children (Clay, 1993). The more children parents have, the more likely some will be loyal, and the chances of parents receiving old age security increases.

Interestingly, the major determinant in the loyalty of one’s children is the amount of land a parent owns. Over 93% of Rwanda’s population lives in rural areas and practices subsistence agriculture (Clay, 1993). Because these people have few alternatives for employment, sons rely greatly on inherited land for farming. Also, the more land a son expects to inherit, the more loyal he will be toward his parents (Clay, 1993). This enables parents to use their landholdings as a bargaining mechanism. Sons that provide more for their parents receive a larger inheritance. For example, in the Karateng sublocation of Kenya, land is divided equally among sons only 40% of the time because parents are sometimes dissatisfied with the support they receive (Hoddinott, 1992). Moreover, as Africa’s intense population growth continues, land is growing more scarce, and the role of land as a bargaining mechanism for parents is becoming more important. This may be especially true in Rwanda, which has an average population density of 280 people per square kilometer—the highest in Africa (Clay, 1993).

Sometimes, however, daughters may be even more important than sons. In Rwanda, 59% of daughters provide support, whereas only 51% of sons contribute to their parents’ old age security (Clay, 1993). Daughters do generally marry and live with their husbands, and most support from daughters happens before marriage (Khasiani, 1994). In many African countries such as Rwanda, women are the farmers and are more likely to assist their parents with labor and present gifts. Sons, on the other hand, earn much more income and are more than twice as likely to give their parents money (Clay, 1993).

In Karateng, sons and their families provide the most assistance with household tasks. Fifty-six percent of sons’ families assist with household tasks compared to 44.3% of daughters’ families (Hoddinott, 1992). However, the daughter-in-law provides almost half of the contribution of sons’ families. Women, therefore, play a greater role in the provision of labor than men do, but sons are extremely valuable to parents for the role their families play.

As households age, the number of children residing at home declines. Kenya’s level of urbanization is greater than Rwanda’s, and it is more common for children to live greater distances from home. In Karateng, sons and daughters living away from home provide the most to parents in terms of the transfer of money and goods (Hoddinott, 1992). Eighty-non percent of Kenyans who have migrated to urban areas send home 20% of their wages (Clay, 1993). Generally in large families the oldest children move away from home before the youngest. This enables parents to access the urban incomes of their oldest children while receiving domestic assistance from the youngest children (Hoddinott, 1992). Thus, parents have yet another incentive to have high fertility in order to obtain old age security.

As levels of education increase in Rwanda, it is slowly becoming more common for children to move away from their parents. Education does not necessarily affect the amount of support a child provides his or her parents. Instead, increasing levels of education is changing the type of support provided (Clay, 1993). Better educated children are significantly more likely to give their parents money, while less educated children are more apt to provide their parents labor.

Due to the absence of government programs and strong market systems, young African parents confront the issue of old age security within the informal setting of the family. Because they cannot know how prosperous their lives will be, how long they will live, or how well their children will look after them, African parents have many children to safeguard against difficult times. The increased labor children supply, the bargaining power of land inheritance over sons, and the prospect of increased upward social mobility all improve the chances that elderly receive old age security. Furthermore, if older children gain access to education or move away from home, parents will receive more money from their these children while being assisted with farm work or household tasks by younger children. In Karateng, 82% of the elderly receive significantly more monetary and household support than the other 18%. Interestingly, the households belonging to the first group average 6.83 children while the latter group averages 3.77 (Hoddinott, 1992). It seems that having more children does in fact increase the elderly’s old age security. Likewise in Rwanda, the support children provide their parents increases proportionately with the number of children parents have. Therefore, having more and more children does not seem to yield decreasing marginal returns (Clay, 1993).

Because having more children increases old age security without decreasing marginal returns, the choices parents make when deciding to have children appear rational. Demographic transition theory states that fertility will begin to decline with economic development. But when assessing the role of children as old age security in Africa, it becomes clear that the threshold is not necessarily economic development, but instead the flow of wealth between the younger African generations and the older ones (Clay, 1993). Not until childrens’ role in old age security changes and wealth begins to flow in the opposite direction from old to young will fertility decline. Whether this event will coincide with strong economic development in African countries remains to be seen, but demographic transition theory may need new emphasis on the role of children to adequately apply to population growth in Africa.

 

 

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