Kevin Lee Coll

Is Improving the Status of Women the Key to Restoring Fertility in the First World? –YES!

By Kevin Lee Coll

In the past fifty years, there has been significant debate regarding the societal consequences of the emancipation of women. More specifically, this paper concerns itself with the nature of the relationship between emancipation and fertility. At the turn of the century, when suffragists clamored for greater civil and economic equality, the issue of low fertility--at a time when it was at relatively high levels--was never used against emancipation. In fact, many women’s rights activists regarded low fertility as consonant with social and economic advancement (Bernhardt 80). This is a view that was shared by many governments in industrialized countries. A 1972 Report of the American Commission on Population Growth, for example, recommended the improvement of the status of women as a means of lowering the fertility rate in the U.S. Indeed, the historical record has generally shown, with the notable exception of Sweden today, that advancements in the statuses and roles of women are inversely correlated with the fertility rate. Norman Ryder has gone as far as stating that, "our past success at population replacement, throughout all of human history, has been conditional on the discriminatory treatment of women." (Bernhardt 81) If, indeed, we are to accept this notion, what are its implications for restoring fertility in industrialized countries with low fertility rates? Moreover, why has Sweden, a highly industrialized country with significant women labor-participation, experienced a rise in fertility? Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to examine the social and economic trends in Europe and East Asia, investigate how they are related to fertility, and lastly, to evaluate whether an improvement in the status of women is the key to restoring fertility in the "First World."

Fertility Rates and Women’s Labor-Force Participation

Many industrialized countries in Europe and East Asia are experiencing exceptionally low fertility rates that threaten their long-term replacement rates. If fertility rates generally remain below 2.1 for an indefinite amount of time--and there is negligible net migration--the population of a particular country will be in long-term decline. According to a study of fertility trends in North America, Europe (West and East), and several East Asian countries, for example, only New Zealand, Sweden, Poland, and the Soviet Union were above the replacement level in 1989 (Kono 1). In spite of the considerable social and cultural differences among these countries, Kono notes that they share many economic and demographic trends affecting the decline in fertility. Dirk van de Kaa refers to this contemporary decline in fertility as the "second-demographic transition."

The second-demographic transition occurs during the transformation from a rural/agricultural to an urban/industrialized society, which is accompanied by a decline in child mortality, waning in religious authority, erosion of patriarchal family systems, spread of universal education and consumer-oriented culture, and the elevation of the status and roles of women. In these urban, industrialized societies, there is a decline in the "traditional utility" of children and an increased cost of childbearing and rearing. Moreover, with more women in the workplace, the opportunity cost of children is significantly higher (Kono 1,2). Under tighter labor market conditions in industrialized countries, increases in women’s wages also increases the opportunity cost of children. A study of women’s labor-force participation in Sweden between 1965-1980, for example, showed that an increase in the proportion of women in the labor force was highly correlated with an increase in women’s wages (Bernhardt 92-93).

The transformation to an urban/industrialized society is also accompanied by an ideological change in people’s values and attitudes towards childbearing. Inglehart coined the term "post materialism" to describe how rising societal affluence affects people’s views by removing worries about fulfilling basic human needs such as food and shelter, and shifting their concerns from group survival to individual satisfaction (Kono 3). In the traditional society, role of women was typically consigned to childbearing, childrearing, and other activities limited to the household; men, on the other hand, were the breadwinners and head of the household. This change in values is conceptualized by the "structural theory of the family," which relates this societal change to the weakening of the structural basis of the family. This occurs when the social system undergoes the transformation from a "community" to "society"--i.e. change from rural/agricultural to urban/industrialized society. (Bernhardt 87). In a community, the family unit is the basic unit of society; while on the other hand, in a society, the individual has become the basic structural unit. The latter is characterized by an ideology of individualism, democracy, equality, and participation.

Women’s Work, Marriage and Fertility in East Asia and Japan

In the past 50 years, fertility rates in the industrialized countries of East Asia (Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan) have declined tremendously. In the mid 1960’s for example, the Total Fertility Rates (TFR) in the first four states were just slightly below five; less than twenty years later, all of their fertility rates were far below the replacement rate (Kono 29). In addition to the general description of the "second demographic-transition" mentioned above, experts point to several particular explanations for this declining trend such as the rapid economic development since the 1970’s; highly successful family planning programs; the spread of women’s education; increase in women’s labor participation outside the home; the postponement of marriage; increases in financial and psychological cost of children’s education; and the advent of mass consumption society and high tech appliances that compete with childbearing (Kono 11-12). Some experts also attribute the decline in fertility in East Asia to a female backlash against the dominant, male-chauvinistic societies under which they have historically unequal and subordinate to their spouses. This reflects a strong disenchantment with the existing societal structure of marriage, family and childrearing. With increased economic independence, women are less inclined to marry earlier or not at all, thus contributing to the general decline in fertility.

The case of Japan in the past 20 years illustrates the complexity of drawing connections between extra-household employment and the fertility rate. Since 1950, the percentage of employed female-labor among the 20-29 aged group has not significantly changed; however, the fertility rate has been in steady decline from 3.65 in 1950, to 1.54 in 1990 (Kono 29). Although studies of the 1987 National Fertility Survey of Japan have shown that there is an inverse relationship between women’s gainful employment and fertility, they have also revealed that part-time workers have a lower probability of conceiving children than full-time workers (Kono 16-17). What accounts for this anomaly? Kono suggests that this is partially due to the definition of "part-time" versus "full-time" work that does not distinguish between work hours, but whether or not one is a regular employee. Put otherwise, part-time workers may, in some cases, actually work longer hours than full-time employees. He also out that greater benefits offered to full time employees are more conducive to childrearing and other household commitments. What this strongly suggests, as described in the Swedish case below, is that the increased availability of social benefits (childcare, maternal leave, etc) has a significant effect on mitigating the opportunity costs associated with having children, and can thus stimulate fertility in industrialized countries with high female-labor participation.

Work, Marriage and Fertility in Southern Europe

A comparison of fertility between southern and northern Europe is illustrative of how the heightened status, role, and employment of women are not entirely correlated with low-levels of fertility. Given the extensive research depicting the inverse relationship between women’s economic activity and fertility, one would believe that northern Europe would have significantly lower fertility than its lesser socio-economically developed southern counterparts in Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. In fact this is a false presumption. The highly egalitarian countries in Scandinavia, specifically Sweden, are actually experiencing an upsurge in fertility, while levels in southern Europe are the lowest in the First World. In Sweden and Norway for example, fertility has increased in recent years from lows of 1.61 and 1.63 in 1983 to recent highs of 2.14 and 1.93 in 1990. By contrast, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal have gone from 1.53, 2.07, 1.94, and 1.96 in 1983 to 1.33, 1.30, 1.43, and 1.48 in 1989 respectively (Kono 28).

Castro Martin of the United Nations Population Division (UNDP) offers four possible explanations for this phenomenon: Firstly, rapid economic and social changes in recent years have put families and women in an uncertain state, causing a decline in fertility. Secondly, the lack of institutional childcare facilities in the face of rapid economic development and expansion of women’s economic activities significantly increases the opportunity cost of children (especially in contrast to the highly developed social support structures available in northern Europe). Thirdly, people are unwilling to forgo their newfound economic prosperity by incurring the high costs of childbearing and rearing. Lastly, the predominant influence of machismo culture still expects women (even those holding employment) to be devoted wives in the household. The persistence of minor male roles in domestic affairs and the increasing role of women in the workplace, combined with the lack of social services such as childcare makes it increasingly costly to bear and raise children in these countries (Kono 8).

Work, Marriage, and Fertility in Sweden

Unlike the experience of Southern European countries in recent years, fertility in Sweden has actually been on the rise. Sweden provides an interesting contrast to the former region because it has the highest female labor-participation rate--91.3 percent--and one of the highest fertility rates in the First World at 2.02 (Bernhardt 92-93, Kono 30). Indeed, it is one of the most egalitarian societies in the world. Experts attribute this trend to the Swedish government’s extensive social services (childcare, social and tax benefits, etc) that help to facilitate women’s entry into the labor market and significantly reduce the costs of childbearing and rearing. For example, under the state’s "cradle-to-grave" social welfare system, families are offered financial breaks and medical benefits to lessen the financial burden of having and raising children. It is further supported an established statutory system of rules and regulations that protect women from being penalized for having children. Put otherwise, women’s labor participation and fertility are compatible if there are extensive social services (generally sponsored by the state) available to reduce the opportunity costs associated with childbearing and rearing in industrialized societies. The efficacy of these government initiatives was most recently exemplified by Sweden’s number one ranking on "State of World’s Mother Index" (2001) that examined factors related to women’s and children’s health, education, and political status.

Conclusion and Implications

The foregoing examination of marriage, fertility, and women’s employment shows that an improvement in the status of women is highly compatible, and even necessary, to increase fertility in industrialized countries. As observed in the cases of the industrialized countries in East Asia and Southern Europe, the persistence of parochial attitudes towards women combined with the lack of efficient social services/initiatives to alleviate opportunity costs of fertility are primary obstacles to increasing fertility in these countries. In the past 25 years, women’s labor-participation rates in industrialized countries have skyrocketed while total fertility rates have steadily declined. Indeed, it is clear that women not only constitute an integral part of the industrial workforce, but that there are far greater incentives to work than have children. As such, the key to restoring fertility is not by maintaining or diminishing the already unequal status/roles of women, but by reducing the opportunity costs associated with fertility. The exceptional case of Sweden, which many experts view as the benchmark for other countries to follow, clearly demonstrates how improving the status of women and increasing fertility are highly compatible if a combination of financial incentives, extensive social services, legal rules and regulations safeguarding mothers who desire to have children, and an overall improvement in the status of women are effectively carried out.

Sources:

Eva M. Bernhardt, "Changing Family Ties, Women's Position and Low Fertility", in Women's Position and Demographic Change, edited by Nora Federeici, Karen Mason and S. Sogner, Clarendon Press, Oxford England 1993, pp. 80-103.

Shigemi Kono, "Relationship Between Women's Economic Activity and Fertility and Child Care in Low-Fertility Countries", paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Population and Women, Gabarone, 22-26 June 1992, United Nations, New York 1992.